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Abstract: This study sheds light on the role of the import diversity of inputs and empirically explores the 
effects of COVID-19 on global value chains (GVCs). Specifically, we explicitly investigate the supply-side 
impacts of COVID-19 on GVCs during the period from January to August 2020 and examine how the 
import diversity of inputs influences such effects, using monthly export data of final machinery products 
for 35 countries and their indicator of diversity with 252 trade partner countries. As a result, we found 
that the negative supply-side effects are greatest in the transport equipment industry among three 
machinery industries. In addition, such negative impacts on machinery industries are larger during the 
trade fall period from February to May. Furthermore, we demonstrated that the import diversity of 
inputs played a significant role in partially mitigating the harmful supply-side effects of COVID-19, 
particularly during the initial period, i.e., February to March. 
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1. Introduction 
The ongoing coronavirus pandemic (hereinafter, COVID-19) has severely disrupted 
international supply chains, also known as global value chains (GVCs). In general, supply 
chains involve many countries in a region or even beyond a region. Therefore, the negative 
impact of any shock can be transmitted to those involved countries, rather than being 
limited to the specific countries that are the origin of the shock. Of course, COVID-19 is not 
the first collapse of GVCs. The 2008–2009 Global Financial Crisis (GFC), for instance, 
represents a typical demand shock that seriously affected the world economy and GVCs, 
although it primarily started as drastic decline in demand in the United States (US) and 
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European Union (EU) markets. In 2011, the Great East Japan Earthquake (EJE) and flooding 
in Thailand delivered big supply shocks that were broadly extended to other countries 
through supply chains. 
Due to the physical and psychological effects of COVID-19, there is a growing debate 
on how to enhance the “resilience” or “robustness” of GVCs for future crises (Remko, 2020). 
Resilience can be defined as the ability to return to normal operations over an acceptable 
period of time, while robustness is the ability to maintain operations during a crisis 
(Miroudot, 2020). In this context, there is a trade-off between efficiency and 
resilience/robustness. According to Jain et al. (2020), supplier concentration (i.e., having 
fewer suppliers) may benefit from volume leverage, better supplier selection, and less 
coordination complexity. In contrast, supplier diversification (i.e., having more suppliers) 
may have advantages in terms of access to alternate sources and supplier competition. In 
short, while choosing the most cost-efficient supplier for each component will improve the 
efficiency of GVCs, sourcing from multiple suppliers for each component may enhance the 
robustness of GVCs. Similarly, an increase in inventory or slack resources raises resilience 
but lowers the efficiency of GVCs. These concepts in GVCs may be at odds with each other, 
at least in the short run (Golgeci et al., 2020). 
Against this backdrop, we empirically examine the role of the import diversity of 
inputs in the effect of COVID-19 on GVCs. As mentioned above, supplier diversification has 
attracted considerable attention as a practical strategy to enhance the robustness of supply 
chains.1 An increase in suppliers enables buyers to easily shift sourcing from disrupted 
suppliers to other suppliers in the event of idiosyncratic supply disruptions (Jain et al., 2020). 
It also lowers the variance in profits induced by disruptions and decreases the time required 
to resolve the disruptions (Mizgier et al., 2015). Diversifying suppliers are expected to 
mitigate the negative effects of the pandemic on GVCs. In this study, we explore this 
mitigation effect at a country level. Namely, we investigate the role of country-level import 
diversity in terms of input varieties and source countries. Although COVID-19 negatively 
affected international trade, such negative effects might be lower for countries importing 
various inputs from various countries. 
Specifically, we explicitly investigate the supply-side impact of COVID-19 on GVCs 
during the period from January to August 2020 using monthly export data of final 
machinery products for 35 countries and their indicator on the import diversity of inputs 
with 252 trade partner countries. The indicator for the import diversity of inputs is 
constructed to measure how much import sources of machinery parts were diversified in 
2019, i.e., a pre-pandemic year, for those exporting countries. Using the interaction term of 
COVID-19 damage with this indicator, we examine how the import diversity of inputs 
                                         
1 See, for example, Tomlin and Wang (2005), Babich et al. (2007), Wang et al. (2010), Tang and Kouvelis 
(2011), Mizgier et al. (2015), Ang et al. (2017), Chod et al. (2020), and Jain et al. (2020). 
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affects the negative supply-side effects, if any, under an environment in which the 
uncertainty in supply chain is high, due to COVID-19. 
Our findings can be summarized as follows. The negative supply-side effects of 
COVID-19 on exports in final machinery products are the largest in the transport equipment 
industry among the three machinery industries analyzed. This negative supply-side impact 
on all machinery industries is larger in the trade fall period from February to May. Our main 
finding is that the import diversity of inputs played a significant role in partially mitigating 
the harmful supply-side effects of COVID-19, particularly during the initial period, i.e., 
February and March 2020. In this period, the uncertainty in supply chains rose due to 
sudden changes in the spread of COVID-19 and related policies as well as direct and indirect 
supply disruptions from China that made the procurement of necessary inputs more 
unstable. In short, we discovered that supplier diversification mitigated the negative 
supply-side effects of COVID-19. 
Our study is related to many existing studies on the effects of negative shocks on 
GVCs. Ando and Kimura (2012) examined the effects of the 2008–2009 GFC and the 2011 
EJE using Japan’s machinery export data. They found that for production networks in East 
Asia, trade in machinery parts and components was robust and the trade relationships were 
maintained and could recover even if they were interrupted. Todo et al. (2015) investigated 
how supply chain networks affected the recovery of firms from the 2011 EJE, using firm-
level data, and revealed that the positive effects of supply chains exceeded the negative 
effects. Hayakawa et al. (2015) explored how Japanese affiliates in Thailand adjusted their 
production networks before and after flooding in 2011. Barrot and Sauvagnat (2016) 
examined major natural disasters in the past 30 years in the US. They showed that when a 
natural disaster hits suppliers, their customers experience a substantial drop in their 
products’ sales. Boehm et al. (2019) is a study on the 2011 EJE and showed that firms in the 
US that relied on Japanese inputs experienced large drops in production after this natural 
disaster.2 
Furthermore, there are several studies on the effect of COVID-19 on GVCs employing 
trade data.3 For example, Hayakawa and Mukunoki (2020) demonstrated that export of 
finished machinery products significantly decreased when the COVID-19 burden was more 
severe in exporting countries and in countries that supplied inputs to those exporting 
countries by using worldwide trade data like ours. Similar findings were obtained when 
focusing on China’s trade (Friedt and Zhang, 2020) and the EU’s trade (Kejzar and Velic, 
2020). In addition, Meier and Pinto (2020) found that US industries with extensive exposure 
                                         
2 Regarding the theoretical analyses, see Acemoglu and Tahbaz-Salehi (2020) and the literature review 
available in that study. 
3 Inoue and Todo (2020), George et al. (2020), and Pichler et al. (2020) provided simulation analyses of 
COVID-19’s effect on GVCs. Inoue and Todo (2020) simulated the economic effect of Tokyo’s possible 
lockdown on production not only in Tokyo but also in other parts of Japan through supply chains. 
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to intermediate goods imports from China experienced a large drop in exports (as well as 
imports, employment, and production). 
Although these studies suggested negative effects being propagated through supply 
chains, they did not explicitly examine the role of supplier diversification. In this sense, Jain 
et al. (2020) might be one of the studies closest to ours. They used firm-level data from the 
US during the 2008–2009 GFC and discovered that supplier diversification is associated with 
slower recovery from disruptions. Although both their study and ours explicitly examine 
the role of supplier diversification in GVCs, there are some crucial differences between the 
two, e.g., firm level versus country level, GFC versus COVID-19, country coverage, and 
empirical methodology. Their analysis is finer in terms of using a firm-level measure of 
diversification but is limited to the case of US, while ours has stronger external validity due 
to the use of worldwide trade data. Also, the GFC had negative effects stemmed primarily 
from the demand side, while COVID-19 seems to cause not only demand disruptions but 
also direct and indirect supply disruptions. In short, these two studies are complementary. 
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. Section 2 presents an overview 
of the worldwide machinery trade in 2020. After explaining our indicator for the import 
diversity of inputs in Section 3, we report our empirical framework and results in Section 4. 
Lastly, Section 5 provides the conclusions of the study. 
 
 
2. Worldwide Machinery Trade in 2020 
This section provides an overview of global exports of machinery goods in 2020. The 
machinery industries [harmonized system (HS) 84–92] in this study are defined as the 
general and electric machinery industry (HS84–85), the transport equipment industry 
(HS86–89), and the precision machinery industry (HS90–92). Monthly trade data at the HS 
six-digit level are available from the Global Trade Atlas maintained by IHS Markit4; the 
database collects the monthly exports and imports by 35 reporting countries as of November 
2020.5 Using this database, global monthly trade in final machinery products is calculated 
since these reporting countries include most of the major countries that export machinery 
goods.6 To avoid possible time lag issues on monthly import data particularly for long-
distance trade via sea freight/sea cargo, we prefer to use monthly export data as much as 
possible instead of using import data as a proxy. 
Figure 1 shows the change in the worldwide exports of machinery goods in January 
to August 2020 relative to those in 2019 by three machinery industries; (a) final machinery 
                                         
4 See https://connect.ihsmarkit.com/gta/home. 
5 The reporting countries and their trade partners are listed in Appendix A. 
6 See the next section for the definition of final machinery products and parts and components in this 
paper. 
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products and (b) machinery parts and components. In this figure, “Month 2” includes both 
January and February. As Table 1 clearly presents, China is one of the most important 
exporters of final machinery products, particularly in the general and electric machinery 
industry. In a period from January to August 2019 (as a benchmark of the normal period), 
China has a share of over 30% of global exports in final products of this industry. However, 
China reports only aggregated trade in January and February in 2020. Moreover, exports 
from China and possibly some other countries with the Chinese New Year holidays in 
general tend to decline during the Chinese New Year holidays, which were in February 2019 
(started on February 5) and January 2020 (started on January 25). Thus, the change in trade 
in February 2020 expressed as a ratio to that in 2019 may underestimate the effects of 
COVID-19 on trade in February 2020. To avoid this, we provide a picture of worldwide 
machinery trade by aggregating trade for two months in Figure 1. 
 
===   Figure 1 & Table 1   === 
 
Clearly, the worldwide exports of final machinery products in 2020 started to fall in 
“Month 2” and sharply declined to record the lowest values in April and May (Figure 1a). 
In January and February, the worldwide exports in general and electric final machinery 
products declined by approximately 10%, which is the largest among the three final 
machinery products. At the bottom or in April and May, however, the transport equipment 
industry experienced a drastic drop of over 60%, while precision machinery and general 
and electric machinery industries dropped by approximately 20% and 10%, respectively. 
Interestingly, worldwide machinery trade started to recover in June, returning close to the 
pre-pandemic level as of August 2020. A similar pattern can also be observed for trade in 
machinery parts and components, although the drop at the bottom for the transport 
equipment industry is smaller for parts and components than for final products (Figure 1b). 
These trade patterns in 2020 suggest that COVID-19 has a negative impact on GVCs in the 
machinery industries and that the period until May can be regarded as a phase of trade 
decline. 
Let us check the detailed patterns of trade and COVID-19 spread, focusing on this 
phase. Figure 2 presents the number of COVID-19 (a) cases and (b) deaths from January to 
August 2020 for East Asia, North America, and the EU. COVID-19 began in January and hit 
China severely in February with a large portion of cases/deaths for East Asia in February of 
this figure. This sudden and rapid spread of COVID-19 in China prevented production 
activities in some provinces, notably Hubei Province, in which many manufacturing 
factories are located. In addition, other East Asian countries also began to be subject to 
COVID-19 (see also Figure B1 in the Appendix). On the other hand, COVID-19 did not yet 
affect most of the countries in other regions such as Europe and North America at that time. 
Nevertheless, worldwide exports in general and electric final machinery products in 
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particular declined by approximately 10% in “Month 2.” Since China is a prominent 
exporter of final machinery products, notably, in this industry, a direct supply shock from 
China must be reflected in the worldwide decline that occurred in “Month 2.” 
 
===   Figure 2   === 
 
Moreover, there may be indirect supply shocks through supply chains. Upstream 
supply disruptions in the affected countries may induce downstream supply shocks even 
in less affected countries.7 China’s shares of exports in machinery parts and components in 
three machinery industries are large (Table 1), and value-added shares of direct and indirect 
inputs from China in each country’s total manufacturing output are also large (Table C1 in 
the Appendix). 8 These large shares suggest that China plays a central role as an input 
supplier for many countries not only in East Asia but also in North America and Europe in 
machinery industries. To reveal the patterns in monthly exports from China, particularly in 
February 2020, Figure 3 presents China’s monthly machinery exports to the world based on 
import data as well as those to Japan, the US, and Germany, which are the key players in 
production networks in East Asia, North America, and Europe. 9  Apparently, China’s 
machinery parts exports to the world, in particular those to the key players in supply chains 
in three regions, significantly dropped in February (and March). 10  This fact indicates 
possible upstream supply disruption in other East Asian countries as well as in North 
America and Europe, which may also induce a decline in their production and exports in 
February and possibly the next month, March. 
 
===   Figure 3   === 
 
Since March, the COVID-19 situation has started to worsen in Europe and North 
America as well (Figure 2). As Figure B1 clearly shows, many countries have suddenly 
started implementing restrictions on the movement of people and lockdown policies in 
                                         
7 Baldwin and Freeman (2020) summarized the impact of COVID-19 as the following three shocks: 
“demand disruptions” (due to macroeconomic drops in aggregate demand, wait-and-see purchase 
delays by consumers, and investment delays by firms), “direct supply disruptions” in the affected 
countries, and “supply-chain contagion” in the less affected countries through supply chains. See also 
Hayakawa and Mukunoki (2020) for the negative supply chain effects of COVID-19. 
8 See Baldwin and Freeman (2020) for additional details on Table C1. 
9 For Figure 3, the data on imports from China by 35 reporting countries are used and expressed as an 
index to January 2019, instead of taking a ratio of the same month of the previous year, considering issues 
related to the timing of the Chinese New Year holiday. As mentioned above, a possible time lag issue for 
monthly import data may remain. 
10 The largest drop in US imports from China in March for machinery parts may partially reflect a time 
lag in import statistics as well as a delay in input imports from China. 
7 
March, although the timing and severity of policies differ across countries. Accordingly, 
global trade in final machinery products significantly declined with a bottom in April/May, 
particularly in the transport equipment industry. One of the reasons for relatively small 
negative effects on the general and electric machinery industry would be that East Asian 
countries, which are important exporters of these final products (6 out of the top 10 countries 
with a share of over 50% of worldwide exports in Table 1), are less affected by COVID-19. 
Another reason would be that positive demand shock products due to the nature of COVID-
19, such as teleworking-related products, exist in this industry.11,12 A typical example is 
HS847130 for laptop computers, including tablets; their worldwide monthly exports from 
April to August in 2020 were constantly 30% greater than during the normal period. On the 
other hand, major export countries for final products of the transport equipment industry 
were severely affected by COVID-19. As Table 1 indicates, Germany, Japan, the US, and 
France account for half of the global exports in these products. Their direct and indirect 
supply disruptions in addition to the demand shocks in this industry may be reflected in 
the severe decline in exports.13 
 
 
3. Import Diversity of Machinery Parts and Components 
This section constructs an indicator for import diversity of inputs in three machinery 
industries. With this indicator, we intend to measure how much import sources of 
machinery intermediate goods are diversified in each machinery industry. Since our aim is 
to measure “Diversity,” we simply use the standard deviation. Specifically, our indicator of 
Diversity in country i for each machinery industry is defined as follows. 






where Mpij represents country i’s imports of a machinery part p from country j at the HS six-
digit level. Machinery parts here refer to all machinery parts at the HS six-digit level, 
including those with zero-valued imports in each machinery industry, to make this index 
comparable across countries. 𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝑥𝑥(∙) is the mathematical operator of taking the standard 
                                         
11 Ando (2020) presented a detailed investigation of the impact of COVID-19 on Japan’s exports and 
imports by shedding light on direct and indirect negative supply shocks in February, negative demand 
shocks, and product-specific positive demand shocks. Positive demand shock products are those related 
to teleworking, disinfection, and the “stay-at-home” environment due to the nature of COVID-19 in the 
machinery industries. 
12 In this industry, the change for final products has been over one since June, while that for parts and 
components has not yet reached one. This indicates that these positive demand shock products contribute 
to such an increase in final products though the negative effects on this industry as a whole still remain. 
13 Most of the final products in this industry are “postpone-able” goods. In addition, e-commerce is not 
very active, unlike some final products in the general and electric machinery industry. This nature of the 
products may also induce more severe demand shocks in this industry. 
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deviation over x. 
Namely, our measure of diversity is computed as follows. First, the magnitude of each 
import (𝑀𝑀𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝) is normalized by total imports in each machinery industry (i.e., imports of all 
machinery parts in the corresponding industry from all trade partner countries). Then, we 
take the standard deviation of the import share over all machinery parts in each industry 
and all countries. Last, we take the inverse of the standard deviation to show that the higher 
value of this index indicates more diversified import sources of machinery parts. This index 
captures country–product–level diversity. Firms may diversify their input sources by 
procuring inputs from multiple firms within one country. Our measure takes a low value 
for this type of supplier diversification. Since COVID-19 affects production and trade in 
many countries, the higher variation over source countries would be more crucial than that 
over supplier firms within a country. In addition, our diversity index tends to take a lower 
value, for instance, if a country is highly dependent on some specific countries at the product 
level from the perspective of the magnitude of import values. In other words, this index 
captures not only the diversity among trade partner countries, but also the diversity in the 
size of trade at the product level. 
We compute the index above by employing data for 2019, which is the year before the 
onset of the COVID-19 pandemic. We use the same database in Section 2, the Global Trade 
Atlas, to obtain data on imports by 35 reporting countries (exporting countries of finished 
machinery goods) from their 252 partner countries. Kimura and Obashi (2010) carefully 
defined the HS six-digit codes of parts and components in machinery industries and 
regarded machinery goods other than those parts and components as final machinery 
products. Our classification of machinery inputs at the HS six-digit level follows this list.14 
Note that this list includes only parts and components categorized in HS84 to HS92. Thus, 
we do not consider intermediate products categorized in other chapters (e.g., tires of 
HS401120)15. Moreover, the value of the index above is sensitive to the total number of HS 
six-digit codes. Since the total number differs among industries, the value of the index is not 
comparable across industries. 
Figures 4–6 depict the index for the import diversity of inputs in three machinery 
industries. East Asian countries, except for Thailand, have lower indices than the average 
in the general and electric machinery industry (Figure 4) and in the transport equipment 
                                         
14 There may be some specific inputs that can be produced by a very limited number of suppliers. Since 
it is almost impossible to diversify suppliers of these specific inputs, the disruption of such suppliers 
causes their global shortage. Obviously, our index based on inputs at the HS six-digit level does not 
enable us to investigate this specific effect. 
15 Input–output (IO) tables are useful for covering these input values from other chapters. However, 
industry classifications in the IO table are too rough to examine the input diversity over products. 
Furthermore, the country coverage in the international IO table tends to be limited and is not sufficient 
for exploring the diversity over countries. 
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industry except Korea and Japan (Figure 5).16 In East Asia, fragmentation of production and 
agglomeration have been formed in production networks, which makes it possible to 
procure necessary inputs relatively easily domestically and/or inside the region. The reason 
for lower diversity in most East Asian countries in these two industries would be that their 
procurement is mostly conducted within the region, including domestic procurement, 
together with their relatively high dependence on China as an input supplier.17 As for the 
precision machinery industry, we cannot find such an extreme tendency; some countries are 
more diversified, while others are not (Figure 6). 
 
===   Figures 4–6   === 
 
From the perspective of input suppliers, East Asian countries, including China, play 
an important role in production networks in Europe and North America, particularly, in the 
electric machinery industry. 18  Long-distance trade is relatively easy and active in this 
industry because parts and components tend to be standardized, small, and highly valued 
for the volume, while the transport equipment industry tends to prefer forming industry 
clustering with short-distance transactions because of the nature of the industry and 
relatively heavy and large intermediate goods that require high transport costs. During the 
last two decades or so, import of parts and components from East Asia by European 
countries, notably by those in Central and Eastern Europe as a bridge between East Asia 
and Western Europe, has rapidly expanded. Such imports by Mexico also rapidly grew as a 
bridge to strengthen the production links between East Asia and the US. 
The above-mentioned features of production linkages between East Asia and other 
regions seem to be reflected in our indicators. European countries have higher indices in 
three machinery industries, indicating that the import diversity of inputs is relatively high 
for most European countries. Indeed, many European countries use direct and indirect 
inputs from other European countries as well as East Asian countries, while East Asian 
countries have almost no input source country in Europe except for Germany (Table C1). 
Such diversity over countries, even beyond the region, would possibly be reflected in the 
relatively high diversity of our index for European countries. Interestingly, Germany has 
very high diversity indices in all machinery industries. Regarding countries in North 
                                         
16 Korea and Japan are included in the top 10 export countries (Table 1). 
17 Relatively lower diversity does not necessarily indicate fewer trade relationships. In Figure D1 in the 
Appendix, for instance, half of the East Asian countries show a larger number of country–product pairs 
with positive trade than average. This implies that East Asian countries have production linkages with 
more countries, although the weight of regional transactions including domestic procurement must be 
heavy in this industry. 
18 See Ando and Kimura (2013, 2014) for the strengthening production linkages of East Asia as input 
suppliers with production networks in Europe and North America. 
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America, only US has high diversity, whereas Canada and Mexico have lower indices than 
the average in all machinery industries. This suggests a typical feature of production 
networks in North America: their significantly high dependence on the US and China (and 
some East Asian countries).19 
 
 
4. Empirical Analysis 
This section conducts an empirical analysis of the role of import diversity in the trade 
effects of COVID-19. We first explain our empirical framework and then report the 
estimation results. 
 
4.1 Empirical Framework 
To investigate the role of import diversity of inputs in the supply-side impact of 
COVID-19 on GVCs, we separately examine finished machinery exports at a monthly level 
in three machinery industries, i.e., the general and electric machinery, the transport 
equipment, and the precision machinery industries. Again, we obtained trade data from the 
Global Trade Atlas, which include monthly exports from the 35 reporting countries to their 
252 partner countries. The entire period of our study extends from January to August in 
2019 and 2020.  
We specify our model as follows. 
𝐹𝐹𝐷𝐷𝐹𝐹𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = exp�𝛽𝛽1 ln�1 + 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖� + 𝛽𝛽2 ln�1 + 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖� ∙ 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖
+ 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖� ∙ 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , 
(1) 
where 𝐹𝐹𝐷𝐷𝐹𝐹𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 indicates exports of finished machinery goods from country i to country 
j in month m of year y. 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 shows the damage by COVID-19 or the uncertainty in 
supply chains due to COVID-19 for export country i in month m of year y. As a proxy 
variable, we use the number of newly-confirmed cases or deaths, which are obtained from 
the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control.20 The numbers are set to zero for 
observations in 2019. We produce the interaction term of this COVID variable with the 
diversity index computed in the previous section, which indicates the import diversity of 
machinery parts in 2019. The coefficient for this interaction term shows how the import 
diversity of machinery parts influences the supply-side effects of COVID-19 on exports of 
finished machinery products under the environment in which supply chains are subject to 
                                         
19 Canada’s ranking increases considerably in terms of the trade relationships in the three industries 
(Figures D1 to D3) compared with Figures 4 to 6, while the ranking of Mexico remains low or even 
declines. This implies that Mexico’s production links might be very limited to a few specific countries. 
On the other hand, Canada may have production links with many countries, although the weight of 
regional transactions is large. 
20 See https://data.europa.eu/euodp/en/data/dataset/covid-19-coronavirus-data. 
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disruptions due to the uncertainty attributed to COVID-19. To focus only on the supply-
side impact, we control for three kinds of fixed effects (𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 , 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖, and 𝛿𝛿𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖), which will be 
explained below. 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖  is a disturbance term. We estimate the equation for each machinery 
industry using the Poisson pseudo maximum likelihood (PPML) method. 
Our fixed effects control for various elements. Country–pair–year fixed effects (𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖) 
capture the effects of standard gravity variables such as geographical distance in addition 
to those of trade agreements, importer’s demand sizes, and exporter’s factor prices (e.g., 
wages). Since this type of fixed effect also controls for the total population, the estimation 
results do not change even if we measure the damage from COVID-19 using the ratio of 
cases or deaths to the total population. Country–pair–month fixed effects (𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖) control for 
the seasonality of trade between the two countries. In addition, the exporter component in 
these two kinds of fixed effects controls for the general effect of diversity, i.e., its effect not 
related to COVID-19. 𝛿𝛿𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 represents the importer–year–month fixed effects. This type of 
fixed effect controls for all importer-specific effects, including the effects of COVID-19 in 
importing countries such as negative demand shocks and product-specific positive demand 
shocks, if any. Namely, we explicitly extract the supply-side impact of COVID-19 by 
absorbing its demand-side impact. These sets of fixed effects contribute to controlling for 
various elements to avoid omitted variable bias. Furthermore, our use of the diversity index 
in the year before the pandemic will lower the possibility of reverse causality. 
Although the entire period of our study is from January to August in 2019 and 2020, 
the restricted period from February to May is also investigated because exports significantly 
declined during this period (the trade fall period, hereafter).21 In addition, we further split 
this trade fall period into two periods, i.e., the initial period (February and March) and the 
more widely spread period (April and May), and examine the differences in input diversity 
effects. As discussed in Section 2, during the initial period, there seem to be direct and 
indirect supply shocks from China. In addition, the supply chain uncertainty attributed to 
COVID-19 rose particularly in this initial period in the sense that the COVID-19 pandemic 
and related policies suddenly changed in many countries worldwide (Figure B1), which 
may have made the procurement of necessary intermediate goods more unstable and 
difficult. In other words, the import diversity of inputs might be more crucial in adjusting 
procurement during these two months. 
 
4.2 Empirical Results 
This subsection reports our estimation results. We cluster standard errors by country 
pair. Table 2 shows the estimation results of the equation without the interaction term with 
                                         
21 For China, the months January and February of both years are omitted due to a lack of data on monthly 
exports (reported by China) for January and February 2020, separately. 
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the diversity index for the whole period from January to August (Panel (a)], and for the 
trade fall period from February to May (Panel (b)). 22  In Table 2, the coefficients for 
COVID-19 are negative and statistically significant in all three machinery industries, 
regardless of whether the COVID-19 variable was the number of cases or deaths, except for 
(V) of Panel (b) with the number of COVID-19 cases for the precision machinery industry. 
As is expected, the negative effects tend to be larger when we focus on the trade fall period 
from February to May. As mentioned in the previous section, our econometric specification 
explicitly extracts only the supply-side impact by absorbing its demand-side impact. 
Therefore, our results indicate that COVID-19 had negative supply-side effects on exports 
in final products of all three machinery industries, and that such negative effects tend to be 
strongest during the trade fall period from February to May. 
 
===   Table 2   === 
 
Furthermore, the absolute values of the coefficients are larger for the transport 
equipment industry than other machinery industries, implying that the negative supply-
side effects are the largest in this industry among the three machinery industries. For the 
whole period, for instance, if the number of COVID-19 cases/deaths increases by 1%, exports 
decrease by 0.079%/0.073% in this industry. Such rates for the transport equipment industry 
are about four times the rates for other machinery industries over the whole period. 
As discussed in Section 2, Germany, Japan, the US, and France account for half of the 
worldwide exports in this industry. According to European Automobile Manufacturers 
Association (ACEA) (2020), most vehicle manufacturers in Europe had had to shut down 
their development centers and production sites for several weeks or even months during 
the lockdown period, and, as a result, EU-wide production losses amounted to more than 
2.4 million motor vehicles (13% of total production in 2019) during the peak crisis months 
of March, April, and May 2020. Three major US vehicle manufacturers also shut down 
approximately 100 factories in North America for about two months since mid-March.23 
The situation in Japan was less serious, but the Japan Automobile Manufacturers 
Association pointed out that exports in motor vehicles significantly declined in May due to 
a drop in overseas demand and a disturbance in input procurement24; the input disturbance 
was more serious for some firms, including occurrences such as unstable imports from 
affected countries (such as India and the Philippines) due to lockdown policies, delayed 
imports (from Southeast Asian countries) due to COVID-19, and unstable procurement from 
                                         
22 Some singleton observations were dropped due to our inclusion of fixed effects. 
23 See the Nikkei article: https://www.nikkei.com/article/DGXMZO59273230Z10C20A5000000. 
24 See the Daily Automotive News online article: https://www.netdenjd.com/articles/-/234519). 
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domestic suppliers due to workers being infected with COVID-19. 25  Aside from the 
negative demand shocks, these supply-side factors must have caused huge negative supply-
side effects on this industry. 
Table 3 reports the estimation results of Equation (1) for the whole period (Panel (a)) 
and the trade fall period (Panel (b)). The key variable here is the interaction term of the 
COVID-19 numbers with the indicator of the import diversity of countries that export final 
machinery products; this measure implies how diversified import sources of machinery 
parts were in 2019. While the coefficients for the COVID-19 numbers are negative, the 
coefficients for their interaction term with import diversity are positive, regardless of 
whether the results are for the whole period or the trade fall period, except for the case with 
the number of COVID-19 deaths for the general and electric machinery industry.26 This 
suggests that the import diversity of intermediate goods with increasing supply chain 
uncertainty due to COVID-19 played a significant role in mitigating the negative supply-
side effects of COVID-19 on exports of finished machinery products. 
 
===   Table 3   === 
 
With a focus on the trade fall period from February to May, we further examined the 
differences in input diversity effects between the initial period (February and March) and 
the more widely spread period (April and May). In Table 4, the coefficients for the 
interaction term with the import diversity of inputs are negative and statistically significant 
in all three cases of the machinery industry, except for the case with the number of deaths 
for the general and electric machinery industry in the more widely spread period. Moreover, 
the corresponding coefficients are much larger for February and March than those for April 
and May in both general and electric machinery and precision machinery industries, while 
the differences between the two periods seem small in the transport equipment industry. In 
the initial period of February and March, increasing uncertainty due to sudden changes in 
the spread of COVID-19 and related policies (see Figure B1) must have been terrible for most 
firms in the world that had never previously experienced this type of crisis. Such uncertainty 
may make the procurement of necessary inputs considerably unstable. In addition, many 
countries tend to depend on China’s inputs and may have faced severe upstream supply 
disruption and possible delay in imports from China. Under these conditions, the import 
diversity of inputs are more likely to mitigate the negative supply-side effects by allowing 
more flexible adjustments in the procurement of necessary inputs during this initial period. 
                                         
25 See the Nikkei article: https://www.nikkei.com/article/DGXMZO58087210V10C20A4I00000 and the 
Daily Automotive News online article: https://www.netdenjd.com/articles/-/233746). 
26  The results for (II) in Table 3 with the number of COVID-19 deaths for the general and electric 
machinery industry show somewhat different patterns. Although the coefficients for two COVID-19 
variables have opposite signs with statistical significance in Panel (a), they are insignificant in Panel (b). 
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===   Table 4   === 
 
The smaller coefficients for April and May in two industries suggest that the role of 
import diversity of inputs is weakened. This may be because the upstream supply 
disruption is no longer a major reason behind the negative supply-side effects on exports in 
the more widely spread period. For instance, production activities may stop or decline 
simply because of policies such as lockdowns or workplace closures in a country that 
produces finished machinery goods. The increasing number of seriously affected countries 
(places) during the more widely spread period could be another reason for the weakened 
role of import diversity of inputs. This reduces the number of potential source countries and 
may make flexible adjustment of procurement more difficult. On the other hand, in the 
transport equipment industry, the import diversity of inputs mitigates the negative supply-
side effects throughout the trade fall period with the uncertainty of maintaining supply 
chains due to COVID-19. 
Last, we take an alternative measure of the potential diversity index. Specifically, we 
use the number of import country–product pairs with positive parts imports in 2019 without 
considering the magnitude of imports. Table 5 reports the results using this potential 
diversity index for the whole period. The coefficients for the interaction term with this type 
of diversity index are positive and statistically significant only for the transport equipment 
industry. This suggests that import diversity with a larger number of trade relationships 
without considering import size matters in this industry while it does not in other 
machinery industries. In other words, considering the magnitude of trade is important 
when it comes to the import diversity of inputs at the country–product level. 
 
===   Table 5   === 
 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
Amid the pandemic, there is a growing debate on how to enhance the 
resilience/robustness of GVCs for future crises. As a practical strategy for that purpose, 
supplier diversification has attracted much attention. Therefore, this study empirically 
examined the role of the import diversity of inputs in the effects of COVID-19 on GVCs. We 
explicitly investigated the supply-side impacts of COVID-19 on GVCs from January to 
August 2020, using monthly export data of final machinery products for 35 countries and 
their indicator on the import diversity of inputs with 252 trade partner countries. Our main 
finding is that the import diversity of inputs played a significant role in partially mitigating 
the harmful supply-side effects of COVID-19, particularly during the initial period, i.e., 
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February and March. Namely, it is shown that supplier diversification contributes to 
enhancing the robustness of GVCs. 
Last, it is worth discussing why we obtained opposite results from Jain et al. (2020). 
One reason may be differences in the shocks, i.e., the 2008–2009 GFC versus COVID-19. The 
GFC had negative effects primarily from the demand side while COVID-19 caused not only 
“demand disruptions” but also “direct supply disruptions” in the affected countries, 
including those in the center of world manufacturing, and “indirect supply disruptions” in 
less affected countries through supply chains, which results in involving most of the firms 
in the world. Thus, under the GFC without severe supply disruptions, lower diversification 
of suppliers worked as follows: “fewer suppliers make it easier for the buyer firm to identify those 
that are better managed and that can recover most quickly from a disruptive event,” as Jain et al. 
(2020) claimed.  
On the other hand, amid COVID, many countries have implemented some form of 
restriction on people and businesses, including lockdown policies and workplace/factory-
closing orders, as well as infection control measures (e.g., social distancing). Moreover, 
whether a country is more or less affected changes over time, and the spread of the COVID-
19 pandemic and related policies also suddenly change. Such variations in the timing and 
degree of suffering from COVID-19 across countries create additional complexity and raise 
uncertainty regarding GVCs. In that sense, supplier diversification may be beneficial for 
GVCs because it can enable firms more flexible adjustments in their procurement by more 
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Table 1. Top 10 Export Countries and Their Shares in Global Machinery Exports in the Pre-
Pandemic Period (%) 
1 CN 34.4 DE 20.4 US 18.1 CN 19.1 DE 18.4 CN 23.0
2 DE 9.1 JP 12.3 DE 15.1 HK 10.4 US 12.7 JP 10.7
3 US 8.4 US 9.2 CN 9.2 DE 9.9 CN 10.3 US 9.7
4 NL 6.2 FR 8.0 CH 8.4 US 9.8 JP 9.1 DE 9.5
5 HK 5.8 KR 6.2 NL 7.6 KR 7.1 MX 6.6 KR 7.8
6 MX 4.5 CN 6.1 JP 5.0 JP 7.0 FR 5.7 HK 6.8
7 JP 4.0 ES 4.7 FR 3.9 SG 5.8 GB 5.5 TW 6.5
8 KR 2.7 CA 5.2 SG 3.9 TW 5.3 KR 4.9 GB 3.5
9 TH 2.3 MX 4.7 GB 3.6 NL 3.2 CA 3.8 SG 3.2
10 TW 2.1 GB 4.5 HK 3.4 FR 3.1 ES 3.4 NL 2.6
Final products Parts and components
Gnrl & Elec Transport Precision Gnrl & Elec Transport Precision
 
Source: Authors’ compilation, based on data available from the Global Trade Atlas. 
Notes: The ranking and shares are based on exports from January through August 2019. East Asian 





Table 2. Basic Results 
Industry
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI)
(a) From January to August
ln COVID -0.020*** -0.017*** -0.079*** -0.073*** -0.017*** -0.021***
[0.003] [0.002] [0.020] [0.021] [0.004] [0.004]
COVID Cases Deaths Cases Deaths Cases Deaths
Log pseudolikelihood -1.3.E+10 -1.3.E+10 -3.4.E+10 -3.4.E+10 -3.7.E+09 -3.6.E+09
Pseudo R-squared 0.9978 0.9978 0.9891 0.9891 0.9974 0.9974
No. of observations 84,508 84,508 58,448 58,448 74,528 74,528
(b) From Feburary to May
ln COVID -0.034*** -0.028*** -0.105*** -0.111*** -0.008 -0.018**
[0.009] [0.006] [0.018] [0.017] [0.008] [0.008]
COVID Cases Deaths Cases Deaths Cases Deaths
Log pseudolikelihood -5.4.E+09 -5.4.E+09 -1.2.E+10 -1.2.E+10 -1.6.E+09 -1.6.E+09
Pseudo R-squared 0.998 0.9981 0.9918 0.9919 0.9976 0.9976
No. of observations 40,818 40,818 27,376 27,376 35,774 35,774
Gnrl & Elec Transport Precision
 
Notes: This table reports the estimation results obtained using the PPML method. ***, **, and * indicate 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels of statistical significance, respectively. The standard errors reported in 
parentheses are those clustered by country pairs. In all specifications, we control for country–pair–year 
fixed effects, country–pair–month fixed effects, and importer–year–month fixed effects. “COVID” 
indicates the measure of the COVID-19 variables. “Cases” and “Deaths” represent the number of 





Table 3. Estimation Results for Supplier Diversity 
Industry
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI)
(a) From January to August
ln COVID -0.054* 0.055** -0.280** -0.303** -0.140** -0.126**
[0.031] [0.024] [0.113] [0.129] [0.063] [0.059]
ln COVID * ln Diversity 0.004 -0.009*** 0.031** 0.036** 0.018** 0.016*
[0.004] [0.003] [0.015] [0.018] [0.009] [0.008]
COVID Cases Deaths Cases Deaths Cases Deaths
Log pseudolikelihood -1.3.E+10 -1.3.E+10 -3.4.E+10 -3.4.E+10 -3.6.E+09 -3.6.E+09
Pseudo R-squared 0.9978 0.9978 0.9891 0.9891 0.9974 0.9974
No. of observations 84,508 84,508 58,448 58,448 74,528 74,528
(b) From Feburary to May
ln COVID -0.259*** -0.013 -0.468*** -0.386*** -0.251** -0.255***
[0.069] [0.043] [0.107] [0.096] [0.102] [0.078]
ln COVID * ln Diversity 0.028*** -0.002 0.056*** 0.042*** 0.035** 0.035***
[0.008] [0.005] [0.016] [0.014] [0.015] [0.011]
COVID Cases Deaths Cases Deaths Cases Deaths
Log pseudolikelihood -5.4.E+09 -5.4.E+09 -1.2.E+10 -1.2.E+10 -1.6.E+09 -1.6.E+09
Pseudo R-squared 0.9981 0.9981 0.9919 0.992 0.9976 0.9977
No. of observations 40,818 40,818 27,376 27,376 35,774 35,774
Gnrl & Elec Transport Precision
 
Notes: This table reports the estimation results obtained using the PPML method. ***, **, and * indicate 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels of statistical significance, respectively. The standard errors reported in 
parentheses are those clustered by country pairs. In all specifications, we control for country–pair–year 
fixed effects, country–pair–month fixed effects, and importer–year–month fixed effects. “COVID” 
indicates the measure of the COVID-19 variables. “Cases” and “Deaths” represent the number of 






Table 4. Estimation Results from February to May: Comparison of Two Periods 
Industry
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI)
ln COVID * Feb/Mar -0.352*** -0.390*** -0.439*** -0.467*** -0.389*** -0.549***
[0.076] [0.076] [0.136] [0.125] [0.136] [0.126]
ln COVID * Apr/May -0.142* 0.06 -0.516*** -0.336*** -0.255*** -0.226***
[0.073] [0.049] [0.118] [0.118] [0.084] [0.057]
ln COVID * ln Diversity * Feb/Mar 0.044*** 0.048*** 0.058*** 0.058*** 0.056*** 0.077***
[0.009] [0.009] [0.022] [0.020] [0.020] [0.018]
ln COVID * ln Diversity * Apr/May 0.014* -0.01 0.054*** 0.033** 0.036*** 0.032***
[0.008] [0.006] [0.017] [0.017] [0.012] [0.008]
COVID Cases Deaths Cases Deaths Cases Deaths
Log pseudolikelihood -5.0.E+09 -5.0.E+09 -1.2.E+10 -1.2.E+10 -1.6.E+09 -1.5.E+09
Pseudo R-squared 0.9982 0.9982 0.9921 0.992 0.9977 0.9977
No. of observations 40,818 40,818 27,376 27,376 35,774 35,774
Gnrl & Elec Transport Precision
 
Notes: This table reports the estimation results obtained using the PPML method. ***, **, and * indicate 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels of statistical significance, respectively. The standard errors reported in 
parentheses are those clustered by country pairs. In all specifications, we control for country–pair–year 
fixed effects, country–pair–month fixed effects, and importer–year–month fixed effects. “COVID” 
indicates the measure of the COVID-19 variables. “Cases” and “Deaths” represent the number of 
confirmed cases and deaths, respectively. “Feb/Mar” is a dummy variable taking the value of one for 
observations in February or March. Similarly, “Apr/May” is a dummy variable taking the value of one 







Table 5. Estimation Results with an Alternative Measure of Diversity  
Industry
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI)
ln COVID -0.068* -0.08 -0.561*** -0.609*** -0.058** -0.036
[0.041] [0.051] [0.190] [0.207] [0.028] [0.035]
ln COVID * ln Diversity 0.005 0.007 0.065*** 0.073*** 0.005 0.002
[0.004] [0.005] [0.025] [0.027] [0.004] [0.004]
COVID Cases Deaths Cases Deaths Cases Deaths
Log pseudolikelihood -1.3.E+10 -1.3.E+10 -3.4.E+10 -3.4.E+10 -3.7.E+09 -3.6.E+09
Pseudo R-squared 0.9978 0.9978 0.9893 0.9893 0.9974 0.9974
No. of observations 84,508 84,508 58,448 58,448 74,528 74,528
Gnrl & Elec Transport Precision
 
Notes: This table reports the estimation results obtained using the PPML method. ***, **, and * indicate 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels of statistical significance, respectively. The standard errors reported in 
parentheses are those clustered by country pairs. In all specifications, we control for country–pair–year 
fixed effects, country–pair–month fixed effects, and importer–year–month fixed effects. “COVID” 
indicates the measure of the COVID-19 variables. “Cases” and “Deaths” represent the number of 
confirmed cases and deaths, respectively. In this table, we use the number of import country–product 
pairs with positive imports of machinery parts in 2019 as a measure of diversity. 
  
24 
Figure 1. Global Trade of Machinery Goods in 2020 Relative to Trade in 2019 
 
(a) Final Machinery Products 
 
 
(b) Machinery Parts and Components 
 
Source: Global Trade Atlas. 
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Figure 2. Spread of COVID-19 in East Asia, North America, and the EU 
 
Source: Authors’ compilation, using data from the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control. 
Notes: East Asia includes China, Hong Kong, Japan, Korea, Taiwan, and 10 ASEAN countries; North 
America includes US, Canada, and Mexico; and the EU includes 27 EU member states and the United 
Kingdom. The number of cases in July and August for North America and the number of deaths in April 






Figure 3. Export of Machinery from China to the World, Japan, US, and Germany in 2020 
(indexed to January 2019 = 1) 
 
Source: Authors’ compilation, based on data available from Global Trade Atlas. 
Notes: Data on the monthly imports from China by 35 reporting countries for January through August 
are used to calculate the export indices of China. Parts2020(2019) and Final2020(2019) refer to exports for 





Figure 4. Diversity Index for General and Electric Machinery Goods 
 
Source: Authors’ compilation. 
 
 
Figure 5. Diversity Index for Transport Equipment 
 


























A FR LU N
L JP A



















































Figure 6. Diversity Index for Precision Machinery Goods 
 















































Appendix A. Study Countries 
 
35 Reporting Countries (ISO 2-letter codes): 
AR, AT, AU, BE, BR, CA, CH, CI, CN, DE, DK, ES, FR, GB, GR, HK, ID, IE, IL, JP, KE, KR, 
LU, MX, MY, NL, PH, PT, RU, SE, SG, TH, TW, US, ZA 
 
252 Partner Countries (ISO 2-letter codes): 
AD, AE, AF, AG, AI, AL, AM, AO, AQ, AR, AS, AT, AU, AW, AX, AZ, BA, BB, BD, BE, BF, 
BG, BH, BI, BJ, BL, BM, BN, BO, BQ, BR, BS, BT, BV, BW, BY, BZ, CA, CC, CD, CF, CG, CH, 
CI, CK, CL, CM, CN, CO, CR, CS, CU, CV, CW, CX, CY, CZ, DE, DJ, DK, DM, DO, DZ, EC, 
EE, EG, EH, ER, ES, ET, EU, FI, FJ, FK, FM, FO, FR, GA, GB, GD, GE, GF, GG, GH, GI, GL, 
GM, GN, GP, GQ, GR, GS, GT, GU, GW, GY, HK, HM, HN, HR, HT, HU, ID, IE, IL, IM, IN, 
IO, IQ, IR, IS, IT, JE, JM, JO, JP, KE, KG, KH, KI, KM, KN, KP, KR, KW, KY, KZ, LA, LB, LC, 
LI, LK, LR, LS, LT, LU, LV, LY, MA, MC, MD, ME, MF, MG, MH, MK, ML, MM, MN, MO, 
MP, MQ, MR, MS, MT, MU, MV, MW, MX, MY, MZ, NA, NC, NE, NF, NG, NI, NL, NO, 
NP, NR, NU, NZ, OM, PA, PC, PE, PG, PH, PK, PL, PM, PN, PR, PS, PT, PW, PY, QA, RE, 
RO, RS, RU, RW, SA, SB, SC, SD, SE, SG, SH, SI, SJ, SK, SL, SM, SN, SO, SR, SS, ST, SV, SX, 
SY, SZ, TC, TD, TF, TG, TH, TJ, TK, TL, TM, TN, TO, TR, TT, TV, TW, TZ, UA, UG, US, UY, 
UZ, VA, VC, VE, VG, VI, VN, VU, WF, WS, XK, YE, YT, ZA, ZM, ZW, ZZ 
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Appendix B. Sudden Changes in COVID Policies across the World 
 
Figure B1. Restricted Movement of People and Lockdown Policies in Asia, America, and 
Europe in February and March 2020 
 
Source: Authors' compilation, using data obtained from https://www.bbc.com/news/world-52103747. 
Note: While China and Thailand confirmed their first cases before January 15, 2020, other countries with 
“the first cases before February 1, 2020” did so in late January. 
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Appendix C. Direct and Indirect Inputs for Manufacturing Output 
 
Table C1. Total Exposure of Row Countries to Manufacturing Sectors of Column Countries: 
Asia, North America, and Europe 
CN JP KR IN TW AU ID US CA MX DE GB FR IT ES TR NL CH
CN 1.9 3.0 1.9 1.5 0.9
JP 6.3 1.2 0.6 1.4 0.7
KR 16.4 4.4 0.6 1.8 2.9 1.8 0.5
IN 7.2 0.9 1.5 0.5 2.1 0.9 0.5
TW 13.8 6.4 3.4 0.6 0.8 2.7 1.3
AU 7.1 2.2 1.5 0.5 1.8 1.0
ID 7.4 2.1 1.9 0.6 0.7 0.9 0.5
US 6.5 1.2 1.0 1.6 1.6 1.0
CA 7.2 1.2 1.1 0.5 14.1 1.4 1.2 0.5
MX 14.3 2.3 2.6 0.7 1.1 15.5 1.0 1.7 0.6 0.6
DE 4.6 0.9 0.6 1.6 1.0 2.0 1.9 1.1 0.6 1.3 1.0
GB 4.8 0.6 0.6 0.6 2.6 0.5 3.9 1.6 1.2 1.0 0.6 1.0
FR 4.1 0.6 2.4 5.7 1.2 2.3 1.9 0.8 0.6
IT 4.6 0.7 0.6 1.1 4.9 0.8 2.3 1.6 0.8 0.8 0.6
ES 4.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 1.2 4.5 1.2 3.3 2.3 0.6 0.8
TR 5.0 1.3 1.0 1.1 2.1 0.6 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8
NL 3.7 0.7 1.8 5.0 1.2 1.2 0.7 0.7
















Source: Baldwin and Freeman (2020). 
Notes: The figures indicate the value-added shares of direct and indirect inputs from the column country 
to the total manufacturing output of the row country, based on Organization of Economic Cooperation 
and Development  Inter-Country Input–Output Tables. Shares below 0.5% are omitted for the sake of 
clarity. ISO-2 codes are used for the country names. Countries in other regions, which are included in 
Baldwin and Freeman (2020), are omitted. 
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Appendix D. Other Figures 
 
Figure D1. Number of Country–Product Pairs with Positive Trade for General and Electric 
Machinery 
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Figure D2. Number of Country–Product Pairs with Positive Trade for Transport Equipment 
 




Figure D3. Number of Country–Product Pairs with Positive Trade for Precision Machinery 
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